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2INTRODUCTION
The notion that compensation policies are strategic, thereby affecting
the missions of the organization, has considerable currency. This is part
of the current popularity of all things strategic. While some may write
it off as another fad, a less cynical view is that a strategic perspective
on compensation is part of a growing recognition that macro-organizational
issues are an important part of the study of human resource management
(Dyer, 1985).
The importance of a strategic perspective on compensation rests on
three fundamental tenets. The first is that compensation policies and
practices differ widely across organizations and across employee groups
within organizations. To some students of organizations this may be self
evident. But to others, such as economists using human capital models to
examine compensation differentials, differences in organizations'
compensation policies and practices are treated as random noise with little
relevance. Anecdotal evidence and sporadic surveys of specific policies
or practices report that differences do exist. (The Conference Board,
1984; American Productivity Center, 1987). For example, some organizations
claim to position their base pay to meet the market, while others follow
it; some design incentive schemes to emphasize long-term performance, others
short term. Some firms employ individual based incentives while others
emphasize group or team based gainsharing schemes. Some decentralize the
administration of compensation, others do not. Some disclose very specific
information about pay to employees, such as ranges and merit guide charts,
while others communicate only the broad policies, such as fairness and
competitiveness. Surprisingly little systematic evidence exists on the
3effects of these differences. So the proposition that policy and practice
differences have meaningful effects requires more systematic study.
The second tenet is that the decisions managers and employees make
help shape these differences; that discretion exists to choose among options
and the processes used to implement them. This does not discount the
importance of environmental effects such as competitive pressures, changes
in tax laws and accounting conventions or workforce demographics. Indeed,
a strategic perspective implies the anticipation of such environmental
pressures and assesses whether these pressures require changes in pay
systems. But tracing all changes and variations in compensation systems
to inevitable exogenous imperatives, leaving only a minor role for
discretionary decision making, does not seem an accurate representation.
Perhaps most fundamental of all the tenets on which a strategic
perspective on compensation is based is the belief that fitting compensation
systems to environmental and organizational conditions makes a difference;
that systematic variation in compensation systems is more than random noise;
that making compensation policies and practices contingent on organizational
and environmental conditions has some desired effects on employee behaviors
and the performance of organizations. Considering that state of research
and theory in compensation, this is probably the greatest leap of faith
(Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987). In light of these beliefs, the present
review focuses on two basic issues: (1) what does it mean to be strategic
about compensation? and (2) what factors affect or are affected by
compensation strategies?
4WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE STRATEGIC?
The term strategy is often used to refer to everything considered
important. The danger is that if it refers to everything, it may mean
nothing. Generally, strategy refers to the overarching, long-term
directions of an organization that are critical to its survival and success.
Strategies take advantage of the opportunities and manage the threats in
the external environment by marshalling internal resources in some coherent,
consistent direction (Dyer, 1985). A strategy may be intended and formally
articulated in some plan or document, or it may emerge through the patterns
of decisions shown by the organization's behaviors. Thus, strategies are
both plans for the future and patterns from the past (Mintzberg, 1987).
Strategy applied to compensation management is particularly ill-
defined. Analogous to the more general definition just discussed, the
term connotes compensation decisions responsive to environmental
opportunities and threats, and linked to or supportive of the overall long-
term directions and purposes of the organization. Thus, all compensation
decisions are not strategic. Most probably are not. Deciding which job
evaluation plan to adopt and which merit increase grid to use are unlikely
candidates. Choosing whether to link pay increases to individual or team
performance and deciding the competitive position in the market are more
likely to have strategic consequences. Culling those decisions that are
not from those that are critical to the performance of the organization
is a major task in defining compensation strategies. Being strategic about
compensation implies support of the business strategy and sensitivity to
anticipated environmental pressures.
5But such a general characterization does not provide much leverage
for research or theory building. Nor does it offer much guidance for
managing compensation. And the folly of undertaking research based on
poorly defined constructs is well recognized (Schwab, 1980). Similarly,
basing managerial decisions on poorly thought out purposes is equally ill-
advised. without defining what is meant by strategic compensation
decisions, it will be difficult to examine the usefulness of such a
perspective.
As a place to start, I offer the following definition: a strategic
perspective on compensation focuses on the patterns of compensation
decisions that are critical to the performance of the organization. Such
decisions, in all likelihood, vary by employee groups within organizations.
The matrix shown as Figure 1 captures this definition. One dimension
involves the critical policy choices which taken together form a pattern
of decisions. The critical employee groups to which these patterns of
decisions apply is the other dimension.
--------------------------
Insert Figure 1 About Here
--------------------------
Given this definition, the major research tasks are to (1) identify
the compensation decisions and employee groups that are strategic, (2)
develop measures or descriptions of these decisions, (3) extract any basic
combination or patterns of decisions that may be related to a variety of
organizations and environmental conditions, and finally (4) determine if
compensation strategies affect workforce behaviors which, in turn, affect
the implementation of an organization strategy.
6strategic Employee Groups
The notion of compensation strategy originally surfaced in the
literature on executive compensation (Cooke, 1976, Ellig, 1981, Salter,
1973). From a strategic perspective, compensation for executives was
defined in terms of several basic elements: base pay, short- and long-
term incentives, benefits, and perquisites. The major strategic decisions
focused on the deployment of total compensation among the basic elements
to best achieve the missions of the organization. Long term incentives
as a percent of total compensation is an example. Attention was directed
at choices among various short-term versus long-term incentive schemes,
the relative emphasis on corporate versus subunit performance, and the
riskiness of the total compensation package.
More recently, a strategic perspective has been extended beyond
executives to middle managers (Kerr, 1985; Broderick, 1986), scientists
and engineers (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1984) and finally to all employees
(Lawler, 1981; Carroll, 1987). An argument can be made that only executives
make strategic business decisions, hence only their compensation has
strategic implications. However, different employee groups may be critical
to the performance of different organizations. For example, one business
strategy may depend heavily on research and development, another on more
efficient production employees, and still another on the sales force.
If certain employee groups may be more (or less) critical to the success
of the organization than others, it follows that their reward systems become
an important part of implementing the organization's business strategy.
Little empirical work exists on identifying employee groups that are
strategically relevant. Lacking that, perhaps the best starting point
7is to simply use the basic occupations for which separate compensation
systems are designed. These typically include executives, managerial and
professional, scientists and engineers, sales, clerical and production.
strategic Compensation Decisions
Turning next to the other dimension of compensation strategy, the
patterns of critical decisions, Table 1 contains lists of decisions deemed
to be strategic in the literature. Both structure and process decisions
are included. The list proposed by Lawler (1981), while not the longest,is
perhaps the most inclusive. It includes the market position (level of
pay relative to competitors), internal versus external orientation,
hierarchy (the steepness of the pay structure and the basis--job versus
skills--for the pay structure reward mix, and the basis of rewards
(performance versus seniority, groups versus individual, criteria used,
etc.). Several issues listed by Carroll (1987) (performance measures,
size of bonus, timing, etc.) seem consistent with Lawler's more broadly
defined issues (e.g. basis for increases). The original issues proposed
for executive compensation have also become more broadly defined and applied
to all employees. For example, both issues proposed by Ellig, (1981) the
relative emphasis to be placed on the various elements of compensation,
and the short- versus long-term, are treated as part of the "mix" decision.
-------------------------
Insert Table 1 About Here
-------------------------
Salter (1973) and Lawler (1981) also considered a series of process
decisions to be strategic. These included congruency (consistency with
other organization systems), standardization of pay systems across subunits,
8communications (the type of data to disclose, the channels to use, etc.),
participation in decision making (levels of employees involved and nature
of involvement), and organization change strategy (the role of compensation
in organization change).
Kerr (1985), focusing on the compensation of general managers, offered
a somewhat different list (35 items in all), including the subjectivity
versus objectivity of performance criteria, the time orientation (short-
versus long-term), the values orientation (performance versus membership),
clarity of the performance-reward relationship, and the proportion of total
compensation devoted to incentives.
The expanding list of decisions claimed to be strategically relevant
raises doubts about the efficacy of a strategic perspective. It brings
to mind the multiple facets of job satisfaction and pay satisfaction that
made the constructs more complex than originally conceived (Heneman, 1985).
What is required is some research to separate those decisions that are
strategic from those that are not. At this point, adopting a generic list
of fundamental policy choices offers a framework for the present discussion
and perhaps a guide for future research. To this end, Table 2 contains
a list of six policies which I propose are strategically relevant. Each
policy involves several underlying decisions and options. These policies
were extracted from the compensation management literature and the work
discussed above.
-------------------------
Insert Table 2 About Here
f---------------
9Competitiveness
The first policy, the degree of competitiveness, can vary among
organizations and among occupations within organizations. From a strategic
perspective, competitiveness refers to positioning a firm's compensation
relative to its competitors (Belcher, 1987; Milkovich & Newman, 1987;
Carroll, 1987). Leading, meeting or following are the conventional options.
However, experience suggests that competitiveness is more complex (Milkovich
& Newman, 1987). The mix of pay forms, the risk-return tradeoffs in the
pay forms, and the average pay level relative to competitors are all
relevant aspects of a firm's policy regarding the competitiveness of its
compensation. The risk-return tradeoff can be illustrated by considering
two managerial pay schemes. One has a $50,000 base salary with merit,
the other a potential return of $70,000; that is, $40,000 base with a
$30,000 bonus potential. Whether these two competitive positions are
equivalent depends on the risk-return tradeoffs of prospect employees.
A risk-return tradeoff incorporates both the proportion of bonus to total
compensation and the likelihood of receiving the bonus (Rabin, 1987).
Clearly the two employers have adopted different competitive positions
in the market. The effects of these different positions on organization
performance and employee behavior are unknown. Such schemes are a common
feature of sales force pay systems (some are straight salary, others are
highly leveraged with incentives) and recent surveys suggest that it is
becoming more common in managerial pay (American Productivity Center, 1987).
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Internal structure
The nature of the internal pay structure is another fundamental policy
that is proposed to be strategically relevant. Typically it refers to
the distribution of rates, or internal pay differentials (Simon, 1957;
Mahoney, 1979; Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987). However, several choices
are involved. These include the number of levels in the pay hierarchy,
factors on which to base the hierarchy, the number of different systems
used to devise the structure, and its congruency with other organization
characteristics. Pay structures differ widely across organizations applying
different technologies. The premise underlying a strategic perspective
is that considerable discretion exists to design different pay hierarchies,
even in organizations with similar technologies. Some organizations have
few job classifications and wide ranges, obscuring differences in task
details and/or specific skill requirements. This allows flexibility to
deploy the workforce without requiring pay changes. other firms with
similar technologies adopt more job classifications with more detailed
specifications of work rules and skill requirements to provide a greater
sense of promotional opportunities (e.g., more title changes). In both
these cases the slope of the pay hierarchy is the same, but the number
of job classes and the differentials between classes differ.
The slopes of the hierarchies may also differ. Variations in
organizational design result from many factors and the internal pay
structure tends to mirror these arrangements. Further, the criteria on
which hierarchies are based may vary. Pay structures in some occupations
are consistent with employee attributes such as knowledge/skills and
experience (e.g., maturity curves for engineers and scientists or knowledge
11
based pay for factory workers), and on job attributes for other occupations
(e.g., job evaluations for managerial, professional, and clerical work).
Finally, the issue of pay equity (i.e., comparable worth) is also
embedded in the internal pay structure. The decision to apply one or more
job evaluation plans across all occupations has implications for comparable
worth (Remick, 1984; Treiman & Hartman, 1981).
Forms of Pay
A third policy in the proposed strategic perspective pertains to the
forms of the mix of various elements of total compensation (Heneman &
Schwab, 1984; Heneman, 1986; Lawler, 1981; Salter, 1973). Total
compensation may include base pay, a variety of incentive schemes, cost
of living adjustments, various forms of stock options and an array of
benefits. Decisions include the number of forms to offer, the degree
to which each is contingent on employees' maintaining their membership
in the organization (e.g., entitlements) or performance (e.g., incentives),
the relative importance of each form (e.g., benefits as a percent of total
compensation) and the proportion of the workforce eligible for each form
For example, in some organizations all employees receive stock options
or deferred compensation, in others only a handful of executives are
covered.
Basis for Increases
The policies for granting pay increases are also proposed to be
strategic. Many facets to these policies are involved; they range from
an emphasis on short- versus long-term incentives (Carroll, 1987; Ellig,
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1976; Salter, 1973; Wallace, 1987), the degree of pay differentiation in
performance differences (Carroll, 1987), the size of the payments (Carroll,
1987; Krzystofiak, Newman & Krefting, 1982; Lawler, 1981), the relative
emphasis on individual versus subunit versus corporate performance (Carroll,
1987; Kerr, 1986; Lawler, 1981; Salter, 1973), and the emphasis on
guaranteed compensation (Carroll, 1987; Rabin, 1986).
Role in HR Strategy
Descriptions of firms' human resource strategies suggest that
compensation plays a variety of roles (Dyer, 1985). In some, compensation
plays a dominant role. High risk-high return incentive plans at financial
investment firms, and performance-based incentives at some manufacturing
firms are examples. In others, compensation appears to be in a coordinate
or even subordinate role to other human resource systems (Herzberg, 1959).
Instead, they may emphasize their employee relations policies (e.g. IBM's
employment security as a shared responsibility and the Hewlett Packard-
"HPWay" ) . In a similar vein, Lawler (1981) suggests that a compensation
system can be out on the point to signal changes in an organization business
strategy, or it can playa less prominent role during organization changes.
So the fifth policy proposed in a strategic perspective is the role of
compensation in the overall human resource strategy.
Administrative Style
Finally, the process used to administer compensation also is regarded
to have strategic properties (Broderick, 1985; Kerr, 1986; Lawler, 1981;
Salter, 1973). Administrative processes involve several choices. Among
13
these are the nature of information to disclose to employees (i.e., broad
policies vs. specific details) the nature of employee participation in
pay design and administration, and the degree of centralization of pay
administration, the nature of dispute resolution procedures.
In summary, these six policies--competitive position, internal
structure, mix among forms, basis for increases, role in human resource
strategy and administrative style--represent a proposed definition of a
strategic perspective on compensation. The need to describe and measure
is a recurring theme in personnel research (Wallace, 1983). In the case
of compensation strategy, this means construct validation of patterns of
strategic decisions involved in the design and administration of pay.
Much work is required here, because the idea of being strategic about
compensation is new. Many employers are only beginning to consider what
it means and what issues are involved. However, research on an emerging
concept may afford an opportunity to offer some guidance in making relevant
compensation decisions, rather than studying past and often outdated issues.
One place to begin is to select employee groups most likely to be
critical to the implementation of an organization's business strategy;
more specifically, employees responsible for the organization's distinctive
competence (e.g., technology) and competitive advantage (e.g., marketing
strategy). General managers in highly decentralized firms and scientists,
engineers and marketing personnel in high technology firms are probably
examples. Once these strategically critical employee groups are identified,
then the patterns in the six compensation policies applied to them can
be assessed.
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Assessing Compensation strategies
strategy as applied to human resource management is bereft of research.
Most of the literature is prescriptive--case studies describing formal
procedures in specific employers. However, a few empirical studies are
beginning to emerge (deBejar & Milkovich, 1986; Dyer, 1985). studies of
strategies specifically related to compensation are even rarer. This
section examines them.
Only one reported study directly posed the question, "Can a set of
critical organizational-level pay decision (i.e., strategic decisions)
be identified and measured?" In this study, (Broderick, 1985), five basic
strategic decisions (competitiveness, hierarchy, mix, increase basis and
administrative style) were extracted from the literature. Two hundred
and eight corporate compensation directors answered a 70-item questionnaire
based on the five basic decisions. Compensation for middle managers was
the focus of the study. Seven factors, shown in Table 3, emerged from
the factor analysis and confirmed most of the strategic decisions speculated
about in the literature. Three structural factors emerged: (1), external
competitiveness (expressed as leads, meets or follows competitors' average
pay level); (2), mix (expressed as the proportion of total compensation
contingent on membership or performance); and (3), basis for pay increases
(expressed as increases based on efficiency/costs improvement or revenue
growth) . And four aspects of administrative style also emerged: (1),
employee participation (2), level of managers approving pay decisions (3)
similarity of plans across business units and (4), formalization. Items
related to the internal pay hierarchies were not found to be significant,
and items about the role of compensation in the overall human resource
15
strategy were not included.
-------------------------
Insert Table 3 About Here
-------------------------
It is not clear why the hierarchical factor was not confirmed. It
may very well be that decisions about the nature of internal pay structures
are infrequently made; that only major environmental jolts, such as threats
of unionization, lawsuits, economic survival or major technological
innovations, act as triggers to cause employers to reconsider the factors
on which the internal structure is based. It may also be that managers
do not consider policies regarding internal structure to be strategic.
It would be interesting to see if replicating this study on another employee
group--engineers, for example--would yield similar results.
All of the remaining research surveyed in this paper adopted a
particular set of pay decisions assumed by the researchers to be strategic.
Little concern over the correctness of their assumption is reported.
Nevertheless, the decisions deemed to be strategic in the literature found
some empirical support in Broderick's (1985) study, at least for managerial
compensation.
FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC CHOICES IN COMPENSATION
The basic issue here is to determine what factors shape the patterns
of policy choices in compensation. Preliminary research in overall human
resource strategy and compensation suggests the following three major sets
of factors are involved: organization business strategies, and factors
in the internal and external environment.
16
--------------------------
Insert Figure 2 About Here
--------------------------
Using the schematic in Figure 2 as a guide, studies of the determinants
of compensation strategy can be grouped into these three sets. Those that
focused primarily on the relationship of organization strategies (i.e.,
corporate, business unit, and functional human resource strategies) to
compensation policies and systems is the first. Most of the reported
research falls here, since in the literature, compensation strategy is
opined to be primarily a function of the organization's overall strategy.
The second group consists of a few studies which consider factors making
up the organization's internal environment. These variables include its
structural arrangements, its administrative style, and its technological
characteristics. Finally, the schematic in Figure 2 suggest the possibility
of a third set of studies; those that treat factors in the external
environment as important determinants of compensation policies.
Organization strategy and Compensation strategy
The nature of an organization's strategy has been postulated to be
the primary determinant of its compensation strategy (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia,
1984; Lawler, 1981; Salter 1973). A convention in the organization
literature is to distinguish among three levels of strategies: corporate,
business unit, functional. These are seen as interrelated but distinct
concepts (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Galbraith & Schendel, 1983; Leontiades,
1982). These three levels have been carried into the strategic human
resource management literature (Dyer, 1985). Since such a variety of
definitions, typologies, and measures of strategies exists at each level,
17
only those used in research directly related to compensation are discussed
here.
Corporate strategies
The two proxies for corporate strategy employed in the research on
compensation strategy are diversification and life cycles. Neither of
these proxies are direct measures of organization strategy. Diversification
seems to be an outcome of a corporate strategy which involves operating
in multiple product markets. Life cycles, arguably, could be a
determination of an organization's business strategy. The lack of clarity
in the meaning of these proxies is but one of the limitation inherent in
this research. Diversification is the most widely used. With it,
organizations are classified as to whether they exhibit a single, dominant,
related, or unrelated product diversification strategy (Rumelt, 1974).
According to organization theory, greater diversification gives rise to
the need for mechanisms to integrate and control the corporation's separate
business units consistent with corporate objectives (Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967). The compensation system serves as a key integration and control
mechanism available to management.
Several studies of corporate diversification also examined compensation
issues (Kerr, 1985). Three issues were of principal interest: (1) to what
degree were division general managers' incentives based on business unit
versus some combination of business unit and corporate performance; (2)
to what degree were their performance measures subjective versus
quantitative and based on end results; and (3) to what degree were general
managers' bonuses discretionary versus formula-based.
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One study of five conglomerates (i.e., unrelated product firms that
grew rapidly by acquisition) and five diversified firms (i.e., related
products that grew more slowly by internal expansion) reported that the
basis for pay increases (performance measurement) and incentives (pay mix)
for division managers varied. This difference was attributed to different
corporate/division relationships in the conglomerates (Berg, 1969, 1973).
The conglomerate's goals were to retain the division managers of acquired
firms and to motivate them to operate as autonomous entrepreneurs
accountable for the performance of their divisions. Accordingly,
compensation increases were based on division performance, using
quantitative end results or financial measures, with considerable discretion
in establishing amounts of bonus awards. Management was by incentives
rather than by controls.
Lorsch and Allen (1973) studied two conglomerates and one vertically
integrated firm. The conglomerates used more formalized procedures with
predetermined indices based on division results; managers' pay increases
were tied to objective formulas and the conglomerates used financial end
results criteria. The integrated firm used a less formal system based
on corporate results, incorporating some intermediate measures as well
as end results measures, which were not linked to pay increases by a
formula. Pitts (1974, 1976) studied the evaluation of division managers
in six Ifinternal growth diversified firmslf (IGDs), similar to Berg's
conglomerates, and five "acquisitive growth diversified firmslf (AGDs),
similar to Berg's diversified majors. He found that four of the AGDs had
pay increases based on division results only; the IGDs used some combination
of division, group, and corporate results. Four AGDs computed bonus awards
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using a formula-based process on quantitative, financial type performance
measures that allowed no discretion in determining bonuses. The rest of
the firms allowed for varying degree of discretion in bonus determination.
These studies, though consistent in findings, only examined a limited
range of the compensation policies proposed earlier in this paper, and
focused only on business unit level managers. Due to sample size
limitations, factors such as size, ratio of labor costs to total costs,
profitability, and so on, were not controlled. Considering these
limitations, Kerr (1985) designed a study of 20 firms, controlling the
sample for size (revenues). Compensation policies included in this study
were pay increase criteria, performance measurement, mix (i.e., salary,
bonus, stock awards, perquisites, and promotions) and administrative
processes. Corporate strategy was measured on two dimensions: degree
of diversification (single-product, dominant-product, related-product or
unrelated product); and process of diversification (growth through internal
evolution versus expansion through mergers, acquisitions, and joint
ventures). Kerr categorized firms according to similarity of compensation
patterns, analogous to the definition of compensation strategy proposed
above. Two compensation strategies were identified. In one, labelled
hierarchy-based, the bonuses for general managers were subjectively
determined and constituted a small portion of total compensation. In the
other, labelled a formal performance based strategy, precise definitions
of performance were tightly linked to pay increases. The process was formal
and objective, the general managers' bonuses were large and formula-based,
allowing little discretion. Internal diversifiers followed the hierarchical
based pay strategy and the evolutionary firms, followed the formal
20
performance-based strategy. Kerr concluded that compensation strategy
was influenced more by the process of diversification than by the extent
of diversification and that the corporate strategy influenced pay strategy
through generating a need for control over the business units.
Based on these studies, the following propositions emerge as
corporations become increasingly diversified: (1) quantitative measures
are used to evaluate managerial performance, (2) pay increases are
determined by objective formulas, (3) performance is more likely to be
defined through subunit performance rather than corporate results, and
(4) compensation strategies are affected by the process of diversification
(internal vs. acquisition).
However, a recent study examining the relationship among corporate
diversification, pay increase criteria, and corporate manager compensation
did not support these earlier findings (Napier & Smith, 1985). Less
diversified firms were reported to use more objective pay increase criteria
and bonuses were a significantly greater proportion of total compensation
in more diversified corporations. The differences in results may be due
to the small sample sizes and the differences in employee groups studied.
The earlier studies all focused on business unit general managers, whereas
Napier and Smith examined pay strategies for a more heterogeneous group,
"corporate level managers." Once again, these differences point to the
need for rigorous definitions of employee groups as well as organization
charact~ristics since strategic compensation decisions are conceived to
be related to both.
21
Life Cycles
Perhaps the most detailed prescriptions of how compensation strategy
should vary with organization strategy have used the concept of life cycle.
The application of life cycles in compensation management originated in
executive compensation, but has since been extended to cover all employees'
pay (Cook, 1973; Ellig, 1982; Milkovich, 1986).
Prescriptions vary depending on the author, but generally the
recommended strategy for an organization in the startup phase includes
an external market emphasis, low base/high incentive mix (though
disagreement exists on the relative emphasis to place on long- versus short-
term incentives), low benefits, and an administrative style that emphasizes
decentralization and informality. The recommended strategy for
mature/stable firms typically has the following pattern: internal equity
emphasis, competitiveness that meets/leads competition, a high base and
benefits/low incentives mix, and administrative processes consistent with
control.
Life cycles have received widespread attention as heuristic devices
in the professional compensation literature, yet, the concept has been
widely criticized. These criticisms include: more than one set of
compensation policies may be appropriate for a given cycle (Wils & Dyer,
1984; Milkovich, 1986; Milkovich & Newman, 1987), it is deterministic (e.g.,
managers' objectives may be to avoid or prevent declining cycles) (Kerr,
1985); and organizations typically have multiple products at different
stages in a life cycle, making classification difficult. Confusion also
exists over types of cycles. Some use product life cycle (Ellig, 1981),
whereas others use the market or industry life cycle and the company life
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cycle (Cooke, 1973). Cooke even alludes to the life cycle or aging of
compensation techniques, paralleling the life cycle of the firm. Life
cycles may more accurately reflect business unit rather than corporate
characteristics, but the criticisms still apply.
For all its attention as a heuristic device, research on life cycles
and compensation systems is rare. As part of their study of 33 high tech
and 72 non-high tech firms' compensation strategies, Balkin and Gomez-Mejia
(1984) reported the effects of two stages in the life cycle; growth (defined
as annual sales growth of 10% or greater) and mature (defined in terms
of product fmniliarity). Firms were classified as high tech if the ratio
of their R&D costs to total revenues exceeded 5%. The hypothesis was that
higher tech firms in the growth stage are more likely to follow an
incentive-based strategy than companies at the mature stage. The authors
concluded that mature firms are more likely to adopt incentives and select
a lower competitive position than firms in the growth stage, which is just
the reverse of what was expected. For some reason the product life cycle
was not significantly related to compensation strategies in firms that
placed less emphasis on R&D. Caution needs to be exercised here. For
example, product familiarity may be more of an indicator of market
penetration and saturation than are measure of a mature stage.
In another study, in which 2000 manufacturing firms were classified
into growth, mature, or declining stages, Anderson and Zeithaml (1984)
reported that the firms' competitiveness (pay level relative to competitors)
was greater in each progressive stage. They also reported that the higher
relative pay in mature firms adversely affected their return on investment.
However, growth firms with higher pay levels relative to competitors'
23
reported increased market share.
Business Unit Strategies
In perhaps the most ambitious study of compensation strategy, Gomez-
Mejia (1987) examined the relationship of both corporate and business unit
strategies to pay strategies. The study was based on survey responses
from compensation professionals in 192 business units in manufacturing
firms. Corporate strategy was defined as the extent of product market
diversification, using Rumelt's classification scheme. Business unit
strategies were grouped into two types: growth and maintenance.
Compensation strategies had several dimensions: competitiveness (i.e.,
market positioning of pay level), pay mix (i.e., relative importance of
salary, benefits and incentives), and 13 administrative policy choices,
which included the basis for pay increases and procedures. The employee
groups to which these compensation strategies applied were not specified.
A number of control variables were also included specifically sales volume,
profitability, and ratio of labor costs to total costs.
The preliminary findings show that the most diversified corporations
(related product markets in this study) are associated with higher pay
levels (competitiveness), greater emphasis on salaries and benefits than
incentives (mix), greater formalization, centralization, and a higher degree
of secrecy. The least diversified firms were associated with lower
competitiveness and greater emphasis on incentives in their pay mix, more
open communication, and decentralized decision making. Using discriminant
analysis, the patterns of compensation policies were able to correctly
classify business units into their appropriate strategy considerably beyond
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chance. The results are interpreted as supporting the proposition that
management adjusts its pay strategies to fit the organization's strategies
(Gomez-Mejia, 1987). In a given business unit, compensation policies and
techniques are affected by both the degree of decentralization at the
corporate level and whether the business unit faces growth or maintenance
in its product markets. And the identifiable patterns of compensation
policies can be identified for different types of business unit strategies.
Harking back to the schematic in Figure 2, the research suggests that
a corporate business strategy has both direct effects on a business unit's
approach to compensation and an indirect effect through the various business
unit strategies. More specifically, the extent that a corporation
diversifies its products, and the process it uses to achieve this
diversification, directly affect its degree of competitiveness, emphasis
on incentives, basis used to determine pay increases, and administrative
style. Conflicting evidence exists on the nature of the relationship.
The strategy of each business unit, defined in terms of its market niche,
also plays a direct role in shaping compensation strategies.
Caution regarding the robustness of these findings needs to be
exercised. Every article emphasizes its preliminary nature; the employee
groups to which the pay policies apply tend to be managerial or professional
or are not well specified; the findings are based on surveyor interview
data; and the data tend to be the perceptions of personnel/compensation
managers.
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Human Resource strategy
Two studies report findings that suggest that an organization's human
resource strategy also affects its compensation policies. The first
examined the relationship between twenty-two business units' strategies
and dimensions of their human resource strategies (Wils & Dyer, 1984).
The business unit strategies were classified as growth, profit, or
stabilization. Human resource strategies were found to vary among these
three business strategies. Managers of growth units listed compensation,
recruitment of new managers, and organization development as the most
important personnel activities. Compensation was not seen as among the
most important activities in either profit or stabilized units. This study
is unique in that it surveyed line managers perceptions rather than
personnel specialists. The authors concluded that compensation in the
context of the total human resource strategy varied with the business
strategies an organization pursues.
The second study analyzed the business and human resource strategies
of business units (129) from a variety of industries to derive an empirical
definition of human resource strategy (deBejar & Milkovich, 1986). After
factor analyzing items describing major personnel activities, the nature
of incentive compensation emerged as a critical dimension. other dimensions
of compensation strategy failed to emerge as critical aspects of a human
resource strategy.
These two studies suggest that an organization's approach to
compensation is also related to its overall human resource strategy. The
results are very preliminary. Compensation was important in growth firms'
human resource strategy but not in other types of business strategy, and
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incentives may be more closely related to the human resource strategy than
other forms of compensation. Here again, managerial compensation was the
focus of these studies.
Internal Environment and Compensation strategy
Obviously, other organization characteristics besides strategies affect
differences in compensation systems. These are treated as part of the
nature of the internal organization environment in Figure 3. The variables
listed are those used in studies reviewed here. Many of them were treated
as control variables (e.g. size, profitability, labor costs/total costs).
Miles and Snow (1978) proposed an approach to typing the
characteristics of organizations which incorporated elements of strategy,
but went beyond it to include structure, administrative style and the like.
The three organization prototypes, Defenders, Prospectors and Analyzers,
have been related to compensation strategies (Broderick, 1985; Carroll,
1987). Defenders and Prospectors have very different, almost opposite
characteristics, whereas Analyzers are a composite of the other two. A
Defender operates in narrowly defined, stable markets. Its structural
design is functional, it emphasizes cost/efficiency-based approaches, and
its administrative style tends to be centralized, formal, and standardized.
Prospectors, by contrast, emphasize innovative approaches to dynamic,
changing markets. Its structure tends to be divisional or product-based,
and its administrative style tends to be decentralized, informal, and
flexible. Analyzers are in multiple markets and tend to be a mixture of
the characteristics of the other two.
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Carroll (1987) has suggested that organizations with such different
characteristics are likely to adopt different compensation strategies.
Broderick (1985) found that they do. The results of her study are
summarized in Table 3. Controlling for organization size (i.e., net sales
and number of employees) and industry, she reported that the patterns among
seven policies (see the third column in Table 3) for middle manager pay
systems differed significantly between Defender and Prospector
organizations. When considered individually, three of the seven policies-
-basis for pay increases (efficiency versus growth), participation, and
formalization--varied significantly across organization types. The other
individual dimensions varied in the expected directions, but were not
significant. Using discriminant analysis, the patterns among the seven
dimensions were able to correctly classify the organizations as the correct
type significantly beyond chance, thus offering additional evidence
supporting the proposition that patterns of compensation decisions vary
among different types of organizations.
Internal labor markets is another approach to classify organization
environments (Osterman, 1984; Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Defined in terms
of the rules that regulate the allocation and compensation of human
resources, internal labor markets have been variously classified as open
(hiring at all levels) versus closed (hiring only at lower skill levels),
craft-professional (technically skilled with little intra-organizational
mobility except within the craft or profession), and salaried-managerial
(general skills with high cross-functional mobility). Different types
of internal markets are described as possessing different compensation
policies. A few case descriptions of internal markets have been published,
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but they remain to be content analyzed for differences in compensation
policies and practices (Osterman, 1984). The nature of the rules used
to determine pay are so intertwined with the definition of internal markets
that an independent measure of each type of market may prove difficult.
External Environment and Compensation strategy
The model in Figure 2 contains a third vector of variables:
legislation, union, and labor markets. This is the external environment
which directly affects compensation strategies. None of the research
studies cited above considered the effects of environmental differences.
Some attempted to control for these effects through sample selection (Balkin
& Gomez-Mejia, 1984; Broderick, 1985; Gomez-Mejia, 1987; Kerr, 1985), but
most simply do not refer to the possibility of environmental effects.
The effect of unions on various aspects of compensation strategy
(level, mix, hierarchy, basis for increases, administrative procedures)
has a substantial research base (Medoff & Freeman, 1984). This body of
knowledge is beginning to be integrated into the strategic human resource
management models (Kochan, Katz & McKersie, 1986; Osterman, 1988).
The responsiveness of compensation decisions to legislative change
is widely discussed, but not systematically researched. For example, the
1986 Tax Reform Act is said to be having a significant effect on executive
and middle management compensation (Cooke, 1987). Other examples of
significant legislation are pension reform and Minnesota's comparable worth
law. Legislative change may trigger different responses in compensation
policies for certain employee groups. For example, include changes in
minimum wage affects lower paid employees, tax reform affects executive
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pay, and pension reform affects all covered employees.
Whether legislative changes allow managers sufficient discretion to
adopt different policies based on their business strategy is open to
conjecture. Increases in the legally required minimum wage need to be
paid. There is nothing too strategic about that decision. However, the
decision to increase investment in automation in anticipation of increased
labor costs has strategic properties since it is critical to the
implementation of the organization strategy. Non-legislative external
jolts such as a strike do permit a variety of adaptations by organizations
with different business strategies and different internal environments.
In summary, external factors have a major effect on the strategic
choices made in compensation. The effects of unions and broad industry
characteristics are well documented in the industrial relations and labor
economics literature. What is missing is systematic data on whether
organizations faced with similar industry and other external pressures
adopt different patterns of compensation policies and practices.
DO COMPENSATION STRATEGIES MATTER
Here we face the "so what" question: to what extent do compensation
strategies matter? Most of those seeking an answer to this question rely
upon contingency theory and the related concept of "fit." Contingency
theory seems a situational art form, ... "there is no one best way--but
all ways...are not equally effective. The choice is dependent or contingent
on something" (Galbraith & Nathanson, 1979). Contingency theory applied
to compensation strategy is depicted in Figure 3. The basic premise is
that compensation strategies and organization strategies should "fit" each
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other; the better the fit, the better the organization's performance.
--------------------------
Insert Figure 3 About Here
--------------------------
Conceptually, several contingencies between organization and
compensation strategies are implied in this model. The most obvious one
is that compensation strategies are more likely to be effective if they
are contingent on the overall strategy followed by an organization, other
things being equal (e.g., the internal and external environment).
Conversely and less apparently an organization's business strategy is more
likely to be effective if it is contingent on it's compensation strategy.
This contingency rests on the premise that successful implementation of
business strategies depends on human resources. Formulating an
organization's strategy involves assessing internal resources. Compensation
decisions directly affect these resources through their impact on expenses
and on their ability to attract, retain, and motivate critical human
resources.
To the extent that the current pay systems are inflexible, they act
as a constraint on the organization's ability to shift its strategy. At
the minimum, implementing a new compensation strategy which better fits
the organization's strategy may be hindered by the existence of the original
pay system, existing union contracts, and the internal norms and
expectations. In such cases, contingency theory predicts that performance
suffers.
The degree of fit between compensation strategy and organization
strategy contributes to organization performance by signaling and rewarding
the behaviors that are consistent with the organization's objectives.
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Further, better fit more accurately signals to applicants the types of
behaviors expected and accommodates compensation demands on the
organization's cash flow (Ellig, 1983). So the degree of fit is the
cornerstone of contingency theory and underlies the presumed effect that
compensation strategy has an organization performance.
Yet doubts remain; one gets a queasy sense of constructing on shifting
sands. All three constructs on which performance depends--organization
strategy, compensation strategy and fit--are elusive, especially fit.
This applies to its use in the policy/strategy literature as well as in
compensation management (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985; Venkatraman & Gran,
1986). Broderick (1985) defined fit empirically as the variance between
compensation policies and business strategies. Two measures were employed.
One was the relationship of each dimension of compensation strategy with
differences in corporate strategy. The other was the relationships between
different patterns of compensation policies and differences in
organizational strategies.
Contingency models applied to compensation treat fit as static. The
reality may be that matching compensation and organization strategies is
like shooting at a moving target. This suggests that both timing and degree
of fit affect performance. A firm that fits its pay system to support
its business strategy, and does it quickly, may have a competitive
advantage. For example, the move to a greater emphasis on performance,
to define performance as team or unit (gainsharing), rather than individual,
and to knowledge-based pay hierarchies is believed to create a competitive
advantage (Lawler, 1981).
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Just how does one determine the appropriate degree of fit. On the
one hand, the more congruent the compensation system with the organization
and its environment, the better the performance. On the other hand,
tailoring compensation strategies to fit too tightly, may straightjacket
the flexibility required to take advantage of future opportunities (Mahoney,
1987).
Research on compensation strategy is so recent that little work has
been reported on its effects on organization performance or employee
behaviors. Some of the work on executive compensation and firm performance
is related (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987). Two studies included attempts
to directly examine the relationship among organization strategy,
compensation strategy and performance (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia 1987, Gomez-
Mejia, 1987). Performance was assessed by asking compensation directors
the extent to which the pay system contributed to the achievement of
organizational goals. The limitations of this measure were recognized
by the researchers but justified using the logic that acceptability is
a key criterion of compensation system performance. Even if this logic
is accepted, managers and employees are arguably more appropriate
constituents to judge pay system acceptability (Tsui & Milkovich, 1987).
So the effects of compensation strategy and the degree of its fit with
organization strategy on performance remain unplowed turf. Considering
the elusiveness of the notion of the degree of fit, it seems like risky
research.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Research on compensation strategy began in the context of executive
compensation and in studies of the relationships between business strategy,
structure, and process. Compensation was conceived as a control mechanism,
executives were the focal group and the nature of pay incentive schemes
was the principal dimension of compensation included. Little recognition
was given to the need to define compensation more systematically.
Typically, the level of analysis was the corporation, and strategies studied
involved diversification.
In subsequent studies, the definition of compensation, the variables
included and the methodologies evolved in several ways. The definition
of compensation needs to be broadened to recognize its multidimensionality.
Research has begun to study variations in the total pattern of compensation
policies in addition to variations in specific policies. The focal group
has been extended beyond executives, to all employees and to employee groups
that are critical to the organization's success. The determinants that
may affect compensation strategy have extended beyond corporate strategies
to include business unit strategies, internal organization factors, and
external factors. Thus, control variables such as industry, labor
costs/total costs, profitability, sales, workforce size, and the like need
to be included in research designs.
More attention needs to be devoted to the effect of environmental
jolts on compensation strategies. It may be, as Mintzberg (1987) suggests,
that strategic reorientations occur in brief quantum leaps. Accordingly,
major jolts are required before organizations realign their business
strategies to set their direction or layout new courses of action. In
34
between such reorientations, stability prevails. If this is so, then
studies of organizations experiencing such jolts and reorientations may
shed light on which compensation decisions have strategic properties,
and what their effects are likely to be. Finally, studies of the
relationship between compensation strategy and organization performance
are beginning, but more are required.
At the root of the interest in a strategic perspective of compensation
is the basic tenet referred to at the beginning of this paper: that human
resource policies in general, and compensation policies in particular,
affect workforce and organization performance. The belief is largely
untested, yet the entire field of human resource management rests upon
it. The research agenda that emerges from a desire to examine this tenet
is extremely complex (Dyer, 1980). It is part of the organizational
perspective on human resource management alluded to at the beginning of
this paper. Its conceptual links are as much to policy, microeconomics,
finance, organization theory and sociology as to micro organization behavior
and psychology (Dyer, 1985).
An immediate need exists for research aimed at collecting accurate
descriptions of the content of compensation strategy and the process
involved in its formulation. What are the critical dimensions of
compensation? For which employee groups? How should such questions be
answered? Asking and/or observing those who are in strategically relevant
roles, such as executives and members of corporate compensation committees,
is one approach. Another is to undertake "policy capturing" studies.
Both require access and data that simply are not readily available.
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Beyond descriptive research, more work is needed to understand both
what determines variations in patterns of compensation decisions their
effects. A major challenge is to formulate manageable research issues.
Issues too narrowly defined suffer from ignoring the multi- dimensionality
of compensation and the context in which compensation decisions occur.
On the other hand, issues too broadly drawn are too time consuming, too
ambiguous, too expensive, and often poorly specified.
Perhaps a place to begin is to identify compensation decisions that
have strategic properties. For example, do firms within the same industry
establish different competitive positions in labor markets? Conventional
wisdom is that they do. How do they accomplish this--by different average
levels of base pay, by varying the risk-return tradeoffs or the ratio of
incentives to total compensation? Do characteristics of organizations
vary with their competitive position? These might include some of the
determinants discussed in this paper such as organization strategies,
organization characteristics, and external factors. Finally does a firm's
competitive position have any discernable effect on the size and quality
of the applicant pool, on its ability to hire those people it selects,
or its ability to retain high performers?
Similar studies need to be conducted for each aspect of compensation.
For example, little is known about the nature of the pay structure or the
mix of pay forms and their effects on workforce behaviors. The same can
be said about each of the dimensions of compensation.
In closing, it is useful to step back and consider the nature of
compensation management. A fairly convincing argument can be made that
existing compensation policies and practices have grown over time in a
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somewhat haphazard manner, as ad hoc administrative responses to various
pressure, rather than through some rational, analytical, objective-directed
process. If that is so, then much of the foregoing has simply been an
attempt to impose structure and rationality on compensation management.
But even if this is the case, the need remains to understand the variation
in these decisions made by organizations and how these variations affect
the behaviors of the workforce and the success of the organization.
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T3b1e 1
Evolution of Compensation Decisions Considered Critical to Organiz~tion Performance
E11ig/Cooke (1976) Carroll (1987)Salter (1973) Lawler (1981)
Employee
Occupation Executives All Employees
Structure
(Design)
Relative Emphasis
on each element
Short vs. long term
incentives
Executives and
Managers
Short vs. long term
incentives
Unit vs. corporate
performance
Degree of risk
(bonus/base)
All Employees
Market position
Internal vs. ex-
ternal emphasis
Degree of hierarchy
Reward mix
Basis for increases
Pay level in market
Internal equity
Performance Measures
Frequency of Measures
Size of Bonus
Merit Differentiation
Use of Individual
Bonus
Use of Group Bonus
Long vs. Short Term
use
Deferred Compensation
Use of Gainsharing
Use of Guaranteed
Compensation
Process
(Adminis-
trative
style)
Pay system congru-
ency
Standardization
across subunits
Pay system congru-
ency
Decision making
Centralization
Communications
Change strategy
.p..
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Table 2
STRATEGICALLY RELEVANT COMPENSATION POLICIES: AN A PRIORI SET
1) COMPETITIVENESS
- Competitive position relative to competi-
tion
- Lead, lag, meet
- Total compensation, risk-return trade-off
- Internal pay differentials
- Number of levels, criteria for hierarchy,
congruency with organization features
- Number of different job evaluation systems
used
- Forms to offer
- Relative importance of each
- Short vs. long term
- Membership vs. performance
- Specific criteria, individual, unit,
corporate performance
- Size and frequency
- Dominant vs. coordinate vs. subordinate
- Signal vs. support organization change
- Employee participation
- Communications
- Centralization
- Dispute resolution mechanisms
2) INTERNAL STRUCTURE
3) MIX AMONG FORMS
4) BASIS FOR INCREASES
5) ROLE IN OVERALL HUMAN
RESOURCES STRATEGY
6) ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE
Table.3
Empirically Derived Dimensions of Compensation Str~tegy
Strategic Issues Liter~ture. Bascd Dimensions Empirically Based Dimensions
(1) Competitiveness (1) External Competition vs.
Internal Pressures
(1) External Competitiveness
(2) Performance/Membership
(2) Internal Hierarchics (2) Differential Hierarchies vs.
Egalitarian Arrangements
(3) Efficiency (costs) vs.
Growth
(3)
(4)
Mix
Pay Increase Bases
Job Content vs.
Knowledge Requirements
(3) Membership vs. Performance
(4) Level of managers par-
ticipating
Level of managers ap-
proving decisions
(5) Administrative Style
(4) Corporate, subunit vs.
Individual
(5)
(6) Standardization, simi-
larity of plans across
.units
(1) Formalization
written documentation
Short vs. Long Term
(5) Degree of Employee Participa-
tion
Degree of Centralization
Based on Broderick (1985).
Degree of Standardization
(consistency across subunits)
Degree of Formalization
+:--
~
CRITICAL
POLICY
CHOICES
Figure 1
A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON COMPENSATION
CRITICAL EMPLOYEES GROUPS
Executives Sales ProductionR&D
Compensation Strategies:
Patterns of Compensation Decisions
that are Critical to the Performance
of the Organization
. . . . .
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Figure 2
DETERMINANTS OF COMPENSATION STRATEGY
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